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TWO APPROACHES TO MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
STARLINK CORN ON U.S. PRODUCERS 
 






The discovery of StarLink corn in U.S. food products caused considerable 
disruption in the corn markets in 2000 and 2001.  We estimated two models on the 
impact of StarLink corn over the 2000/2001 marketing year.  In the first model, to 
segregate the U.S. corn market, identity preservation costs (IP costs) were imposed on the 
U.S. grain handling system to deal with both domestic and export sales of food corn and 
export sales of non-food corn to Japan.  In the second model, structural changes in corn 
demand were taken into account.  Without taking into account Loan Deficiency Payment 
Program (LDP) payments, significant costs were incurred by producers as a result of 
StarLink.  However, the effectively reduced the loss in revenue that would have been 
caused by StarLink, since there were periods of time immediately following the 
discovery of StarLink during which the market price dropped below the loan rate for 
corn.  It was estimated that StarLink caused U.S. producers to lose between $25 and $290 
million in revenue. 
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TWO APPROACHES TO MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 





In the late 1990s, Aventis CropScience (Aventis), a multinational firm based in France, 
introduced StarLink corn into the United States with the knowledge that the U.S.  
Environmental Protection Agency had not approved StarLink corn for human 
consumption.  StarLink corn contains Cry9C protein, which is toxic to European corn 
borers and certain other insect pests.  On September 18, 2000, the Cry9C gene contained 
in StarLink corn was found in a sample of Taco Bell taco shells (Kraft Foods, Inc.).  
After testing by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, nearly 300 food products were 
recalled.  Because of the recalls, Archer Daniels Midland began testing corn deliveries at 
its elevators on October 12, 2000, and Japan temporarily halted U.S. corn imports on 
October 27 until testing procedures were firmly established. 
StarLink corn was grown on approximately 362,000 acres in 2000, roughly 40% 
of which was in Iowa.  It became commingled with non-StarLink corn in the U.S. grain 
handling system.  According to Lin et al. (2001), commingling of StarLink corn with 
other corn varieties was exacerbated by three factors: (1) some of the corn grown on the 
buffer zone was probably cross-pollinated with StarLink corn, (2) a portion of the 
StarLink corn (including that grown on the buffer zone) had entered the marketplace 
prior to the effort to contain StarLink-commingled corn, and (3) some elevators did not 
know they were receiving StarLink-commingled corn.  The commingled corn may have 
come from either the 1999 or 2000 corn crop because StarLink was grown in 1999 but 
was not detected.  For U.S. corn to be sold for food purposes both in the United States  
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and in major importing countries, such as Japan and South Korea, it now had to be 
segregated and tested and certified StarLink-free.  Once implemented, StarLink testing 
became highly stringent—the tolerance level ranged from one kernel in a sample of 400 
(in the United States) to as much as one kernel in three samples of 800 (in Japan).   
As a direct result, several class-action lawsuits ensued.  Fingers et al. v. Kraft 
Foods North America, Inc, et al. was one such case.  The plaintiffs claimed they had 
allergic reactions to food containing Cry9C.  The Centers for Disease Control tested the 
17 people, who claimed StarLink had made them sick, and found that none of them had 
antibodies consistent with allergic reactions to StarLink.  However, despite these results, 
a federal judge approved a $9 million settlement in March 2002 (Robinson 2002).   
Mulholland et al. v. Aventis Crop Science USA Holding, Inc. was another such 
case.  The plaintiffs, who were non-StarLink corn growers in seven Mid-western states, 
claimed property damage and corn loss claims.  Property damage claimants were 
compensated for lost market value, transportation, and storage costs resulting from actual 
contamination of their crops, fields, equipment and property.  Corn loss claimants were 
compensated for the alleged reduction in the general price of corn due to the presence of 
StarLink corn in the U.S. corn supply.  A settlement for $110 million was reached in 
February 2003 (Uchtmann 2002).   
The latter case is also applicable to ongoing debates over the acceptance and 
impacts of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) both within the United States and 
abroad.  The StarLink incident illustrates the complexity of isolating crop varieties within 
the existing grain marketing system and preventing unwanted commingling.  
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The discovery of StarLink in food products caused considerable disruption in corn 
markets in 2000 and 2001 (Lin et al. 2001-2002).  To segregate the U.S. corn market, 
identity preservation costs (IP costs) were imposed on the U.S. grain handling system to 
deal with both domestic and export sales of food corn and export sales of non-food corn 
to Japan.  These costs reduced the revenue that U.S. corn producers would have received 
in the absence of StarLink during the 2000/2001 marketing year.  However, the Loan 
Deficiency Payment Program (LDP) effectively reduced the loss in revenue due to 
StarLink, since there were periods of time immediately following the discovery of 
StarLink during which the market price dropped below the loan rate for corn.  This study 
develops one model that encompasses both IP costs and the LDP program to obtain 
empirical estimates of the impact of StarLink on U.S. corn producers over the 2000/2001 
marketing year.  These quantitative results are consistent with the results of Lin et al. 
(2001).  A second model is developed that incorporates the structural changes in corn 
demand. The dollar impacts from both models as a result of StarLink are compared to the 
court settlement amount referred to earlier. 
Theoretical Framework (No Structural Change in Demand) 
Domestic and foreign corn markets facing the United States are depicted in Figure 1 
(Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky 2000; Gardner 2000; Schmitz, Schmitz, and Dumas 
1997; and Just, Hueth, and Schmitz 1982).  Panel A represents the U.S. corn market and 
Panel B represents the export market for U.S. corn in the rest of the world.  The total 
supply curve for U.S. corn is ST.  This supply curve is vertical because the forthcoming 
analysis focuses on the implications of StarLink for the 2000/2001 marketing year only.  
Shipments of corn containing StarLink did not get turned away until October 15, 2000, at  
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which time nearly the entire U.S. corn crop had been harvested.  Producers did not have 
time to adjust their planting decisions; hence the supply of both food and non-food corn 
for the 2000/2001 marketing year was already fixed by the time StarLink was discovered. 
The total domestic demand schedule for U.S. corn in the absence of StarLink is 
DT in Panel A.  The excess supply and excess demand schedules for all U.S. corn are 
ESUS and EDUS (Panel B), respectively.  The equilibrium price for U.S. corn in the 
absence of StarLink is P*.  The total quantity of corn produced and consumed in the U.S. 
is Q* and QD
*, respectively. 
Total U.S. corn demand is divided into the demand for food corn (DF) and the 
demand for non-food corn (DN).  The equilibrium quantity of food corn consumed in the 
U.S. in the absence of StarLink is QF
* and the quantity of non-food corn consumed is 
QN
*.  The total equilibrium quantity of corn exported by the U.S. is X
*, which is 
comprised of U.S. food corn exports (XF
*) and U.S. non-food corn exports (XN
*).  
The discovery of StarLink in the U.S. grain handling system introduced additional 
IP costs in the U.S. corn sector.  Elevators were willing to pay less for corn because the 
additional IP costs had to be borne directly throughout the supply chain for all food corn 
sold to both domestic and foreign markets and to all non-food corn exports to Japan.  
The IP costs induced by StarLink caused the domestic demand for food to shift to 
DF
S (Figure 1).  This resulted in a new (kinked) demand curve for all U.S. corn equal to 
DT
S, which shifted the import demand schedule for U.S. food corn from EDF to EDF
S.  In 
addition, the import demand schedule for Japanese non-food corn imports (not shown but 
included in the total import demand for U.S non-food corn) also shifted inward.  This 
caused a slight reduction in the import demand schedule for all U.S. non-food corn  
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exports from EDN to EDN
S.  These two reductions in the demand for U.S. food and 
non-food exports resulted in a new (kinked) excess demand schedule for all U.S. corn 
equal to EDUS
S. 
The equilibrium price of corn induced by StarLink dropped to P
S, while Q
* did 
not change, because U.S. producers did not have time to adjust supply during the 
2000/2001 marketing year.  However, the total quantity of corn consumed in the United 
States increased from QD
* to QD
S.  The quantity of food corn consumed in the United 
States was reduced from QF
* to QF
S and the quantity of non-food corn consumed in the 
United States increased from QN
* to QN
S. 
Total U.S. corn exports were reduced from X
* to X
S as a result of StarLink.  U.S. 
food corn exports dropped from XF
* to XF
S and U.S. non-food corn exports changed from 
XN
*to XN
S.  The relative shapes of the supply and demand curves drawn in Figure 1 
depict the situation in which U.S. exports of non-food corn increased from XN to XN
S 
because of StarLink.  However, depending upon the relative shapes of the demand 
schedules, U.S. exports of non-food corn could theoretically be higher or lower after 
StarLink was introduced.  There is a trade-off between the outward shift in the excess 
supply schedule, that induces an increase in U.S. non-food corn exports, and the inward 
shift of the excess demand schedule for non-food corn, which induces a decrease in U.S. 
non-food corn exports. 
The economic impact of StarLink on U.S. corn producers is measured by the 
difference between the total revenue in the absence of StarLink and the total revenue in 
the presence of StarLink.  Using this measure of economic loss, if it had not been for 
StarLink, U.S. corn producers would have received an additional amount of revenue  
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equal to the cross-hatched area in Panel A of Figure 1 over the 2000/2001 marketing 
year, ceteris paribus. 
The Costs of Identity Preservation 
The discovery of StarLink in the grain handling system, in October 2000, forced grain 
handlers who wanted to sell their corn into the food corn market or to the Japanese feed 
market to separate corn along the supply chain.  The combination of all costs incurred 
due to testing and segregating corn throughout the entire supply chain is referred to as IP 
costs.  When grain is delivered to an elevator, it is dumped into a pit and then transferred 
via a lift to a chain that distributes the grain to various storage bins in the elevator.  To 
keep corn separate, farmers must be responsible for keeping the grain path between 
StarLink and StarLink-free deliveries clean, and separate facilities must be established 
and maintained. Establishing separate grain handling facilities introduces additional costs 
from inefficient utilization of space (sometimes referred to as “storing air”).  
We use estimates on segregation costs for corn based on studies, including Bender 
et al. (1999); Maltsbarger and Kalaitzandonakes (2000a); and Lin et al. (2000).   
Maltsbarger and Kalaitzandonakes (2000a,b) and Bender et al. (1999) estimated the cost 
of separating high oil corn.  While there is value in separating high oil corn, the degree of 
separation required to obtain the premium allows for a much higher degree of tolerance 
than the tests developed for StarLink.  Specifically, a variation in the relative corn content 
may result in some dockage but may not disqualify the entire shipment of corn, while one 
kernel in a sample of 400 kernels (or even three samples of 800 kernels in the case of 
Japan) can cause a shipment of corn to be rejected.  Given this difference, we suggest that 
the separation cost for StarLink is somewhat higher than for high oil corn.  
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Given the range of incremental costs reported in the literature, there are several 
ways to define the increased cost of grain segregation.  First, we could simply use the Lin 
et al. (2000) results of 22¢ per bushel.  These results are closest to official USDA 
estimates.  However, the estimates are somewhat higher than the others, because the 
segregation costs developed by Lin et al. (2000) include 4¢ per bushel for testing.  
Deducting the cost of testing from the USDA results yields an estimated IP cost of 18¢ 
per bushel, which appears to be more consistent with the other results for corn.  For the 
purposes of obtaining empirical results in this study, we approximate the IP costs 
associated with StarLink by averaging the mid-point of the Maltsbarger and 
Kalaitzandonakes (2000b) results with the results for Lin et al. (2000) adjusted by the 
testing cost, the European Union estimate, and the estimate from Bender et al. (1999).  
This procedure gives an average IP cost of 19.75¢ per bushel, which we use in our 
analysis.  However, we also perform a sensitivity analysis at a much lower IP cost 
estimate of 10¢ per bushel (Schmitz et al. 2003).
1 
The Impact of StarLink (IP Cost Model) 
The Absence of the LDP Program 
In our analysis, the 1997-1999 period was used because these are the most recent years in 
which we know (for certain) the marketing conditions that prevailed in the absence of 
StarLink.  To estimate the impact of StarLink, it is necessary to differentiate between 
food and non-food corn.  The USDA-ERS separates corn into feed and “Food, Seed, and 
Industrial Use” (FSI).  The FSI category contains high fructose corn syrup (HFCS), 
dextrose, starch, fuel, beverages, products, and seed.  The data on FSI reported for the 
USDA from 1980/81 through 1999/00 are provided in Table 1.  StarLink corn is  
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acceptable for use in creating ethanol fuel.  In addition, some companies did not restrict 
the use of StarLink corn for HFCS (mostly used in making soft drinks), while other 
companies (such as Pepsi) did.  Due to the lack of information regarding how much 
HFCS was processed from corn that contained StarLink, we assume that one-half of the 
HFCS was certified StarLink-free.  Therefore, for the purposes of this study, food corn is 
defined as that contained in the FSI category, minus the amount used for fuel, minus one-
half of the amount used for HFCS.   
The amount of corn produced by the United States is given in Column 1 of 
Table 1.  This supply is either sold as exports (Column 2), feed consumption in the 
United States (Column 3), or FSI consumption in the United States (Column 4).  Total 
domestic use of U.S. corn (Column 5) is equal to the sum of feed and FSI from the prior 
two columns.  In this study, food corn (Column 6) is subtracted from domestic use to 
compute the amount of non-food corn consumed in the United States (Column 7).   
Average total U.S. corn production from 1997 to 1999 was 9.46 billion bushels, 
of which 1.8 billion bushels were sold as combined exports, 1.05 billion bushels were 
sold as U.S. food corn, and 6.6 billion bushels were sold as U.S. non-food corn.  Hence, 
13.7% of all corn consumed in the United States is considered food corn and the 
remaining 86.3% is considered non-food corn.  It is assumed that U.S. food and non-food 
corn are exported at the same ratio as in the domestic U.S. market.  Hence, 1,807 million 
bushels (Table 1, Column 2) of the total U.S. corn exports are divided into 248 million 
bushels of food corn exports and 1,559 million bushels of non-food corn exports.
2   
As discussed previously, the IP costs associated with StarLink result in the 
following:  (1) a downward shift in the intercept of the demand schedule for U.S. food  
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corn; (2) a downward shift in the intercept of the excess demand schedule for U.S. food 
corn exports; and (3) a slight downward shift in the intercept of the excess demand 
schedule for U.S. non-food corn that is caused by the fact that IP costs must also be 
incurred for non-food shipments to Japan.  To obtain empirical estimates of the losses 
accruing to producers because of StarLink, we must first determine the degree to which 
the intercepts of these curves shifts.  Each of these is discussed in turn. 
The 3-year average price of corn received by U.S. producers, as reported by the 
National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) from September 1997 through August 
2000, was 2.06¢ per bushel.  Hence, additional IP costs of 19.75¢ per bushel represent a 
downward shift of 9.6% in the intercept of the demand schedule for U.S. food corn.  This 
translates into an effective shift in the entire demand schedule for all U.S. corn by 1.3%, 
because food represents only 13.7% of the entire demand schedule for U.S. corn. 
The excess demand for U.S. food corn exports must also shift downward by the 
same percentage as above (1.3%), because the additional IP costs must be incurred on all 
food corn exported from the United States and because it is assumed that the ratio of food 
to non-food corn exports is the same as the ratio of food to non-food corn consumed in 
the United States. 
Total average exports of U.S. corn to Japan were 587 million bushels over the 
1997/98 through 1999/2000 marketing year, according to the USDA-ERS data in Table 1.  
Out of that amount, it is assumed that 80 million bushels (13.7%) are used for food 
purposes and the remaining 493 million bushels used for non-food purposes.  U.S. 
non-food corn exports over that same time period were 1,559 million bushels.  U.S. 
non-food corn exports to Japan comprised 31.6% of all U.S. non-food corn exports.   
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Hence the downward shift of 9.6% caused by the additional IP costs must be applied to 
31.6% of all U.S. non-food exports.  This translates into an effective shift in the excess 
demand for U.S. non-food corn by 3%.  Combining this result with the shift in the excess 
demand for U.S. food corn, results in an effective shift in the total excess demand 
schedule for U.S. corn of 4%.  
To estimate actual monetary values using the model described above, the shapes 
of the U.S. supply and demand curves (ST and DT in Panel A of Figure 1) and the shape 
of the excess demand curve facing U.S. corn producers in international markets (EDUS in 
Panel B of Figure 1) must be specified.  To obtain empirical estimates, these curves are 
assumed to be linear.
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To obtain empirical estimates, the intercept and the slope of the demand schedules 
(DF, DN, and DT in Panel A of Figure 1) and the excess demand schedules facing the U.S. 
(EDF, EDN, and EDUS in Panel B of Figure 1) must be estimated.  Estimates of these 
parameters can be obtained by specifying the elasticities and by using the actual prices 
and quantities that existed over the 1997/98–1999/2000 period.  Following the modeling 
work of the USDA-ERS, the price elasticity of U.S. corn demand was estimated as falling 
between –0.3 and –0.5.  In addition, Adams (1996) estimated a demand elasticity of        
–0.673.  For this analysis, we use a value of –0.5, which is near the middle of this range.  
The elasticity of the excess demand for U.S. corn in international markets has not been 
estimated specifically.  It is generally accepted that the excess demand elasticity for feed 
grains does not fall below   –1.0.  Some have suggested that it may be as high as –20 
(Schmitz and Gray, 2000).  A conservative estimate of the excess demand elasticity for 
U.S. corn exports of –2.0 is used for the most likely outcome described below.   
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Estimates of changes in U.S. corn markets, resulting from the introduction of IP 
costs for sales of food corn and for sales of non-food corn to Japan, are provided in 
Table 2.  Consider the outcome associated with an IP cost of 19.75¢ per bushel, an 
elasticity of the domestic demand for all U.S. corn of –0.5, and an elasticity of the excess 
demand for all U.S. corn exports equal to –2.0.  But for StarLink, during a typical 
marketing year (represented by 3-year average, 1997/98–1999/00) U.S. corn producers 
would have received an additional 10.18¢ per bushel, all else remaining equal.  This 
translates into additional revenue of $964 million dollars.  But for StarLink, domestic 
food sales would have been 125 million bushels higher and residual food sales would 
have been 47 million bushels higher.
4   
The second column of Table 2 under the IP costs of 19.75¢ per bushel represents 
the empirical results where the elasticity of demand for U.S. corn equals –2.0 and the 
elasticity of excess demand for U.S. corn exports is –5.0.  The average price of corn 
received by all U.S. producers following the discovery of StarLink would have been 
6.22¢ per bushel higher had StarLink not been discovered in the grain handling system, 
giving a loss of $589 million in aggregate revenue realized by all U.S. corn producers.  
Corresponding estimates were also obtained in the case in which IP costs are reduced to 
10¢ per bushel.  Under these scenarios, the average reduction in price induced by 
StarLink drops to 3.15¢ to 5.16 ¢ per bushel, which translates into estimated damages of 
$298 to $488 million for a typical marketing year immediately following StarLink.
5 
Adjusted for the LDP Program 
The above estimates may seem somewhat high partly because the empirical results apply 
only in a typical marketing year during which no loan deficiency payment (LDP) is paid  
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by the government to U.S. corn producers.  However, the marketing year from September 
1, 2000 through August 31, 2001 experienced unusually low corn prices that, at times, 
fell below the U.S. loan rate.  From September 1, 2000 through August 31, 2001, LDP 
payments were made (Schmitz, Moss, and Schmitz, 2004).  Hence, the estimates from 
Section IV must be adjusted to account for the dampening effect of the LDP.   
The estimated changes in corn markets due to the IP costs due to StarLink are 
divided into 24 bimonthly periods.  Each period is weighted by the corresponding value 
for total use.  Each outcome in Table 2 is adjusted for the LDP and then aggregated over 
the entire marketing year to generate Table 3. 
As a first example, consider the most likely outcome associated with an IP cost of 
19.75¢ per bushel (Table 2, Column 1).  This indicates a price drop of 10.18¢ per bushel 
for the 2000/2001 marketing year.  However, Column 3 of Table 3 indicates that the 
average LDP rate was 17¢ per bushel for U.S. corn producers during the second period of 
October.  Because this is higher than the losses attributed to StarLink in the absence of 
the LDP program, 604 million bushels of the total corn crop for the 2000/2001 marketing 
year (Table 3, Column 2) are estimated to have no effect on the actual price or revenue 
accruing to U.S. corn producers during that 2-week period. 
As a second example, Table 3 indicates that in the second period of January 2001, 
the average LDP rate was 6¢ per bushel.  The average price effect attributed to StarLink 
for the entire marketing year is 10.18¢ per bushel (from Table 2).  Hence, the economic 
loss accruing to U.S. corn producers in the second period of January is equal to (10.18–
6.00) or 4.18¢ per bushel.  If this is multiplied by the approximate use of 325 million  
13 
bushels (Table 3, Column 2), the economic loss to U.S. corn producers resulting from 
StarLink from January 16 through January 31, 2001 equals $19.5 million. 
Note that in Table 5 sales are not affected by the LDP adjustment.  Only the U.S. 
corn producers are affected by LDP payments.  The only difference is that the U.S. 
government makes up some of the loss in market price induced by StarLink by paying 
corn producers extra money through LDP payments.   
When adjusting for LDP payments, one likely outcome (Table 3, Column 1) 
indicates an average drop in the price that farmers actually received (which includes the 
price they receive from the market plus the LDP payments taken) of 3.04¢ per bushel.  
This results in an economic loss of $288 million dollars accruing to all U.S. corn 
producers as a result of the introduction of StarLink corn from September 1, 2000 
through August 31, 2001.  The LDP adjustments made for each of the other outcomes are 
also provided in Table 3.  The impact ranges from 0.27¢ to 3.04¢ per bushel, which 
translates into losses of between $26 million and $288 million.  Note that these numbers 
are much lower than those generated from the model that did not take the LDP program 
into consideration (Table 2).   
Theoretical Framework (Structural Change in Demand) 
In the following discussion, we model the impact of StarLink, assuming that the 
StarLink-contamination event caused a structural change in the import demand for U.S. 
corn from abroad.  From September 1, 1999 through August 31, 2000, the United States 
exported 623 million bushels of corn to Japan. From September 1, 2000 through 
August 31, 2001, the United States exported only 573 million bushels of corn to Japan 
(USDA/FAS, 2004). Hence the Japanese import demand for U.S. corn dropped by 50  
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million bushels during the 2000 market year. This represents an estimated 7.95% 
reduction in the Japanese demand for U.S. corn exports induced by the StarLink- 
contamination event.
6  
In Figure 2, we illustrate a model with a structural change in import demand.  In 
this framework, the LDP program is also considered.  The excess demand curve of corn 
facing the United States  , ED  combined with the U.S. domestic demand curve  , d D  gives 
total demand  . t D  The U.S. supply curve of corn is  . US S  Under free trade, corn production 
is  , f q  domestic consumption is  2, q  exports total  1 q , and the free trade price is  . f P  
Suppose the market price for corn falls below the loan rate (as it did at times 
during the 2000/01 marketing year) and the loan rate  l p  is above the market price  . f p  
Production then increases to  l Q  and exports and domestic consumption also increase. 
The market-clearing price for corn is  m p  and the LDP is  . lm p pb a Assuming that the 
StarLink-contamination event caused the excess demand schedule to shift to  , ED′  and 
assuming that planting decisions were already made so that supply does not adjust, the 
market price and the producer price both fall to  . n p  However, even though the market 
price falls from  m p  to  , n p  the loan rate remains at  l p  and producer welfare is not 
affected, because producers receive LDP payments in an amount of  b b p p n m ′  to totally 
offset the potential losses associated with a drop in prices. However, only during part of 
the period under investigation was the loan rate binding.  
We use the parameters discussed in the previous model to carry out our analysis 
on the impact of the StarLink-contamination event.  Following the modeling work of the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service (USDA/ERS), the price  
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elasticity of U.S. corn demand is estimated at between –0.3 and –0.5 (USDA/ERS, 2004). 
In addition, Adams (1996) estimates a demand elasticity of –0.6. For the analysis  
in this study, a value of –0.5 is used for the medium-sensitivity outcome described below. 
Sensitivity analysis is also performed for demand elasticities of –0.3 and –2.0.   An 
estimate of the excess demand elasticity for U.S. corn exports of –5.0 is used for the 
medium-sensitivity outcome described below. Sensitivity analysis is also performed for 
excess demand elasticities of –2.0 and –20.
7 
The Impact of StarLink (Structural Change in Corn Demand) 
The Absence of the LDP Program 
Estimates of the change in U.S. corn markets in a typical marketing year (represented by 
the 3-year average from 1997/98 through 1999/2000) resulting from the reduction in 
Japanese demand for U.S. corn exports caused by the StarLink-contamination event are 
provided in the first three columns of Table 4. The fourth outcome in Table 4, foreign 
demand, refers to the hypothetical case in which the demand for U.S. corn exports in all 
countries (not just in Japan) is reduced by 7.95%. The last outcome, foreign and U.S. 
food demand, refers to the hypothetical case in which the demand for U.S. corn exports in 
all countries is reduced by 7.95% and the demand for food corn within the United States 
is also reduced by 7.95%.  
Japan’s high-sensitivity outcome is based on a 7.95% reduction in Japanese 
demand for U.S. corn exports, a U.S. corn demand elasticity of –2.0, and an elasticity of 
U.S. residual export demand of –20. (This is a more conservative estimate of the true 
impact of reduced Japanese demand for U.S. corn.) But for the Starlink-contamination 
event, during a typical marketing year the average price received by all U.S. corn  
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producers would have been U.S. 4.17¢ per bushel higher and U.S. corn producers would 
have received an additional U.S. $395 million in revenue, when compared to what they 
actually received over the 2000/01 marketing year. The quantity of U.S. food corn sold 
increased by 42 million bushels and domestic nonfood corn sold increased by 267 million 
bushels. This occurred because the StarLink-contamination event increased the supply of 
corn in the U.S. domestic market, since the United States was forced to sell less corn to 
the Japanese market. The StarLink-contamination event did not affect the total quantity 
of U.S. corn sold with respect to a typical marketing year in the first year immediately 
following the event, because the StarLink-contamination event occurred in September 
and the area of U.S. corn planted was pre-determined much earlier in the season. 
Also provided in Table 4 (Columns 2 and 3) are the results associated with 
medium- and low-sensitivity demand curves in which the demand elasticities are made 
smaller. As the demand curves become more inelastic, the effect of the StarLink-
contamination event on prices and producer revenue increases, while its effect on 
domestic food and nonfood sales diminishes. However, the corn price and revenue 
impacts do not change considerably as the demand curves become more inelastic.  
In summary, reduced Japanese demand for U.S. corn caused by the StarLink-
contamination event would have caused the price of corn received by U.S. producers to 
drop by between U.S. 4.17¢ per bushel to U.S. 5.18¢ per bushel. This drop in the price of 
corn received by U.S. farmers in 2000/01 would have reduced the aggregate revenue 
accruing to U.S. corn producers by between U.S. $395 and U.S. $491 million. However, 
as shown in the next section, the LDP program in the United States had a significant  
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dampening effect on the magnitude of the changes in prices and revenue actually 
attributable to the StarLink-contamination event. 
Scenario 2 is based on a 7.95% reduction in the aggregate excess demand for U.S. 
corn exports in the rest of the world, including Japan and all other countries. It assumes a 
domestic demand elasticity of –0.5 and an excess demand elasticity of –5.0. This is a 
hypothetical outcome that could represent the situation in which all countries would 
decide to import less U.S. corn because of the StarLink-contamination event. But for 
StarLink-contaminated corn, during a typical marketing year unadjusted for LDP the 
average price received by all U.S. corn producers would have been U.S. 13.82¢ per 
bushel higher and U.S. corn producers would have received an additional U.S. $1.3 
billion in revenue. 
The last outcome shown in Table 4 refers to the hypothetical situation in which 
the aggregate excess demand for U.S. corn exports in international markets is reduced by 
7.95%, and the domestic demand for U.S. food corn is also reduced by 7.95%. To obtain 
results associated with a 7.95% reduction in the domestic demand for U.S. food corn 
alone, excluding feed corn, it is first necessary to differentiate between food and nonfood 
corn. StarLink-contaminated corn, for example, is acceptable for use in creating ethanol 
fuel. In addition, some companies have not restricted the use of StarLink-contaminated 
corn for high fructose corn syrup (HFCS), which is used mostly for making soft drinks, 
while other companies such as PepsiCo have. For the purposes of this study, food corn is 
defined as that corn contained in the food, seed, and industrial (FSI) category as defined 
by the USDA, minus the amount used for fuel, minus one-half of the amount used for 
HFCS because of the selectivity criteria used by soft-drink manufactures. Using this  
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definition, the 3-year average quantity of food corn consumed in the United States from 
1997 to 1999 was 1.05 billion bushels. 
The 3-year average level of corn production from 1997/98 through 1999/2000 in 
the United States was 9,465 million bushels. Of this amount, 1,807 million bushels of 
food and nonfood corn were exported by the United States. Hence, 7,658 million bushels 
of corn were consumed in the United States. Of this amount, 1,050 million bushels were 
consumed as food corn, and 6,608 million bushels were consumed as nonfood corn. 
Hence, 13.7% (1,050 million bushels food corn consumption divided by 7,658 million 
bushels total U.S. consumption) of all corn consumed in the United States is considered 
food corn while the other 86.3% is considered nonfood corn.  
The results associated with a reduction in both the domestic demand for U.S. food 
corn by 7.95% and the foreign import demand for both U.S. food and nonfood corn by 
7.95% (Table 4, Column 5) show that StarLink-contaminated corn caused corn prices to 
fall by U.S. 15.83¢ per bushel higher. 
Adjusted for the LDP Program 
Estimates are given in Table 5 on the impact of the StarLink-contamination event, taking 
into account LDP payments.  The five adjusted LDP outcomes in Table 5 correspond to 
the five outcomes in Table 4. The Table 5 results are discussed below and are compared 
with the results from Table 4. 
In the presence of the LDP program, the 7.95% reduction in Japanese demand for 
U.S. corn exports caused by the StarLink-contamination event reduced the average price 
received by U.S. corn producers by between U.S. 0.5¢ and U.S. 0.83¢ per bushel, 
translating into lost revenue of only between U.S. $48 million and U.S. $78 million. In  
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2000/01, the LDP program essentially reduced by 88% the burden of the StarLink-
contamination event that otherwise would have been passed on to U.S. corn producers 
(i.e., the adjusted numbers in Table 5 represent only 12% of the impact that the StarLink-
contamination event would otherwise have had in the absence of a government program). 
A comparison of the last two columns in Tables 4 and 5 reveals similar results. 
Conclusions 
We have presented two models on estimating the impact of the well-published 
StarLink-contamination event.  In our opinion, reasonable results can be obtained from 
either model.  However, likely, the ideal model would incorporate both IP costs and 
structural changes in demand in the presence of StarLink.  The results show that the 
results depend on the proper accounting of U.S. farm policy—the loan rate for corn. 
  The $110 million settlement reached in February 2003 falls within the range of 
our empirical estimates, even with the property damage claims of $10 million and legal 
fees estimated at approximately $44 million.  An important point here is that because of 
the size of the U.S. corn crop (nearly 10 billion bushels), a $100 million drop in revenue 
represents only approximately a 1¢ per bushel reduction in the realized producer price 
over the 2000/2001 marketing year.  However, this is the exact amount that corn loss 
claimants—those compensated for the alleged reduction in the general price of corn 




                                                      
1 It is important to point out that IP costs are a decreasing function of the degree of tolerance.  In the 
StarLink case, the tolerance level for StarLink in corn exports into Japan and South Korea was close to 
zero.  This makes segregation next to impossible, given the limitations of the production and handling 
processes.  For example, if StarLink were present in concentrations of 0.2%, there would be a 99% 
probability that a lot of corn would be rejected using a 2,400-kernel sample size. 
2 In this model, we use a food to total consumption ratio of 13.7%.  However, it has been suggested in an 
EPA White Paper that this ratio is closer to 23%.  If this is the case, then our estimates of damages are 
conservative. 
3 In reality, these curves are most likely not linear.  However, since we are dealing with small changes 
relative to the size of these markets, a linear curve represents a first-order mathematical and statistical 
approximation and has been used in a large number of studies that estimated the economic impact of shocks 
to market equilibrium. 
4 As more evidence of the reduction in U.S. corn exports to Japan induced by the introduction of IP costs 
due to StarLink, FASonline [http://www.fas.usda.gov/export-sales/myfiaug.htm] reports that actual U.S. 
corn exports to Japan from September 1, 2000 through August 31, 2001 were 573 million bushels.  That 
same publication also reports that U.S. corn exports to Japan from September 1, 1999 through August 31, 
2001 were 623 million bushels.  This translates into a 9.2% reduction in actual U.S. corn exports to Japan 
from the year prior to the introduction of StarLink.  This number is very close to the 9.6% shift in the 
export demand schedule induced by the 19.75¢ per bushel IP cost for U.S. exports of food and non-food 
corn to Japan, estimated in the above analysis.  
5 Results were also obtained for an IP cost of 29¢ per bushel.  Although not shown, this would have 
decreased the price received by U.S. farmers by 14.95¢ per bushel, which translates into a loss of $1.5 
billion in aggregate revenue.  
6 Unfortunately, in this type of partial-equilibrium analysis, one cannot hope to identify the true reduction 
in the Japanese residual-demand curve encountered by U.S. producers, since it would require the inclusion 
of all of the supply and demand functions for corn in all international markets. Therefore, in the absence of 
other information, 7.95% is only an estimate. The true reduction in Japanese corn demand caused by the 
StarLink-contamination event could possibly vary from this estimate. 
7 The analysis presented in this article is concerned with the impact of the StarLink-contamination event in 
the marketing year immediately following the discovery of StarLink corn in the food chain. Since U.S. 
producer-planting decisions must be made in the early part of the year, and StarLink corn was not 
discovered until the latter part of the year, there was insufficient time to allow a supply response to the 
StarLink-contamination event; thus the supply curve in this analysis is vertical. Results for a supply curve 
that is not perfectly inelastic (representing year 2) were calculated by the authors, but in the interest of 
brevity, are not included in this paper.  
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*Table 1. Supply and Use of Corn in the U.S. (1980/81-1999/00)* in Millions of Bushels 





            
1980/81          6,639   2,391 4,232      659  4,248 542   3,707 
1981/82          8,119   1,997 4,245      733  6,122 556   5,566 
1982/83          8,235   1,821 4,573      854  6,414 607   5,807 
1983/84          4,174   1,886 3,876      930  2,288 638   1,651 
1984/85          7,672   1,850 4,115   1,067  5,822 680   5,142 
1985/86          8,875   1,227 4,114   1,152  7,648 718   6,931 
1986/87          8,226   1,492 4,660   1,233  6,734 774   5,960 
1987/88          7,131   1,716 4,789   1,252  5,415 794   4,621 
1988/89          4,929   2,028 3,934   1,298  2,901 831   2,070 
1989/90          7,532   2,367 4,383   1,370  5,165 865   4,300 
1990/91          7,934   1,727 4,609   1,425  6,207 887   5,321 
1991/92          7,475   1,584 4,798   1,534  5,891 940   4,951 
1992/93          9,477   1,663 5,252   1,556  7,814 923   6,891 
1993/94          6,338   1,328 4,680   1,609  5,010 929   4,081 
1994/95         10,051   2,177 5,460   1,705  7,874 940   6,934 
1995/96          7,400   2,228 4,693   1,612  5,172 975   4,197 
1996/97          9,233   1,797 5,277   1,692  7,436 1,011   6,425 
1997/98          9,207   1,504 5,482   1,782  7,703 1,035   6,668 
1998/99          9,759   1,981 5,472   1,860  7,778 1,038   6,740 
1999/00          9,431   1,937 5,664   1,913  7,494 1,078   6,416 
                    
1997-
99*** 
        9,465   1,807  5,539   1,852   7,658 1,050   6,608 
*The crop year begins September 1 and ends on August 31. 
**For the purposes of this study, food corn is defined as Food, Seed, and Industrial use 
(FSI), minus the amount used as fuel, minus ½ of the amount used for High Fructose Corn 
Syrup (HFCS). 
***3-year unweighted average of 1997/98 through 1999/00 crop years. 
****The USDA breaks down domestic use in terms of Feed and FSI.  For the purposes of 
this study, domestic use is separated into Food and Non-Food Use. 
Domestic Use is computed as the difference between U.S. production and exports. 
Source: Feed Situation and Outlook Yearbook, Market and Trade Economics Division, ERS-




Table 2.  Impact of StarLink (Not Adjusted for LDP Payments)
a 
IP Cost  (¢/bu)         19.75          10.00 







Corn Price (¢/bu)  -10.18 -6.22 -5.16  -3.15
Revenue (mil $)  -964 -589 -488  -298
Domestic Food Sales 
(mil bu)  -125 -238 -63  -121
Residual Food Sales 
(mil bu)  -47 -105 -24  -53
Domestic Non-Food 
Sales 163 399 83  202
Residual Non-Food 
Sales 8 -56 4  -28
Total Sales (mil bu)  0 0 0  0
aChanges are estimated using average market conditions from (1997/98-1999/00) to 
represent a typical marketing year. 
bU.S. corn elasticity demand = -0.5; U.S. corn export elasticity excess demand  = -2.0. 
cU.S. corn elasticity demand = -2.0; U.S. corn export elasticity excess demand  = -5.0. 
 
 
Table 3.  Impact of StarLink in 2000/2001 (Adjusted for LDP Payments)
a 
IP Cost (¢/bu)      19.75         10.00 






   
Corn Price (¢/bu)  -3.04 -1.19 -0.82  -0.27
Revenue (mil $)  -288 -112 -78  -26
Domestic Food Sales 
(mil bu)  -125 -238 -63  -121
Residual Food Sales 
(mil bu)  -47 -105 -24  -53
Domestic Non-Food 
Sales 163 399 83  202
Residual Non-Food 
Sales 8 -56 4  -28
Total Sales (mil bu)  0 0 0  0
aChanges are estimated using average market conditions from (1997/98-1999/00) to 
represent a typical marketing year. 
bU.S. corn elasticity demand = -0.5; U.S. corn export elasticity excess demand = -2.0. 
cU.S. corn elasticity demand = -2.0; U.S. corn export elasticity excess demand  = -5.0. 
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Table 4: StarLink-Contamination Event: A 7.95% Reduction in Demand for 
U.S. Corn: 2000/01
a 




















(¢/bu) –4.17  –4.76 –5.18 –13.82  –15.83
Producer 
Revenue  
(U.S. mil $)  –395  –451 –491 –1,309  –1,499
  Millions of Bushels 
Domestic 
Food Sales  42  12 8 35  –85
Residual 
Food Sales  –42  –12 –8 -35  –23
Domestic 
Nonfood 
Sales 267  76 50 221  254
Residual 
Nonfood 
Sales –267  –76 –50 –221  –146
Total Sales  0  0 0 0  0
aChanges are estimated using average market conditions from 1997/98 through  
1999/2000 to represent a typical marketing year (ceteris paribus). 
bThe high-sensitivity scenario is associated with an aggregate U.S. corn demand 
elasticity of –2.0 and an elasticity of U.S. residual export demand of –20. 
cThese medium-sensitivity scenarios are associated with an aggregate U.S. corn 
demand elasticity of –0.5 and an elasticity of U.S. residual export demand of –5. 
dThe low-sensitivity scenario is associated with an aggregate U.S. corn demand 





Table 5: StarLink-Contamination Event: A 7.95% Reduction in Demand for 
U.S. Corn Adjusted for LDP Payments, 2000/01
a 




















(¢/bul) –0.50  –0.69 –0.83 –5.21  –6.47
Producer 
Revenue (U.S. 
mil $)  –48  –65 –78 –493  –613
  Millions of Bushels 
Domestic 
Food Sales  5  2 1 13  –35
Residual Food 
Sales –5  –2 –1 –13  –9
Domestic 
Nonfood Sales  32  11 8 83  104
Residual 
Nonfood Sales  –32  –11 –8 –83  –60
Total Sales  0  0 0 0  0
aChanges are estimated using average market conditions from 1997/98 to 
1999/2000 to represent a typical marketing year (ceteris paribus). 
bThe high-sensitivity scenario is associated with an aggregate U.S. corn demand 
elasticity of –2.0 and an elasticity of U.S. residual export demand of –20. 
cThese medium-sensitivity scenarios are associated with an aggregate U.S. corn 
demand elasticity of –0.5 and an elasticity of U.S. residual export demand of –5. 
dThe low-sensitivity scenario is associated with an aggregate U.S. corn demand 



















Figure 1. Economic Impact of StarLink on Domestic and International Corn 
Markets  
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